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CATCH AND CONTAIN NOVEL PATHOGENS EARLY!—ASSESSING 
U.S. MEDICAL ISOLATION LAWS AS APPLIED TO A FUTURE 
PANDEMIC DETECTION AND PREVENTION MODEL 
By April Xiaoyi Xu* 
I. INTRODUCTION: PROPOSING A MODERN “TEST-AND-ISOLATE” FUTURE 
PANDEMIC PREVENTION MODEL AND IDENTIFYING RELEVANT LEGAL ISSUES 
As of July 2, 2021, there have been 196,553,009 confirmed cases 
of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), including 4,200,412 deaths, 
globally.1 Unfortunately, infectious diseases have been an 
“unavoidable fact of life” throughout history.2 While the global 
community looks forward to a gradual return to normalcy from 
COVID-19 with an increasing number of individuals getting 
vaccinated on a daily basis,3 the COVID-19 public health crisis has 
exposed significant inadequacies in many countries’ pandemic 
responses—the United States included.4 Governing authorities must 
actively consider more effective solutions to quickly detect and 
prevent the spread of future pandemics.  
One proposed model that offers promising potential, but is not 
yet developed in greater detail, is a future pandemic detection and 
monitoring architecture. This Comment will refer to this 
architecture as the “test-and-isolate model.” In his May 2020 
 
 * Juris Doctor, Harvard Law School, Class of 2021. I would like to thank Professor I. 
Glenn Cohen for his guidance on this Comment and his mentorship throughout my law school 
years. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank my family, friends,  boyfriend, and 
professors for their constant support. I am grateful to my mentors at the World Health 
Organization (WHO) for sparking my initial interest in public health when I interned there as 
an undergraduate student, and to Andrew B. Liu (Ph.D. candidate at Harvard Medical School) 
for sharing his insights on epidemiology and bioinformatics. I would also like to thank the 
editors of the Michigan Journal of Law Reform for selecting this Comment for publication and 
for working tirelessly with me to finalize this article. 
 1. WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https:/
/covid19.who.int (last visited July 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DY8J-H89Z]. 
 2. See MADELINE DREXLER, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT INFECTIOUS DISEASE (2010), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK209704/ [https://perma.cc/XV44-5HJV].   
 3. See, e.g., Statistics and Research: Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations, OUR WORLD IN 
DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations (last visited Apr. 26, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/KQP5-CS7G]. 
 4. See, e.g., Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf, & Mara Mordecai, U.S. Image Plummets 
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Scientific American article, biochemist Dr. David J. Ecker 
recommends strategically placing modern high-speed metagenomic 
sequencing technology in urban hospitals across the United States to 
flag previously-unknown pathogens before the infectious agents 
have the opportunity to spread widely and pose threats of a new 
pandemic.5 Under this model, during a time period without any 
apparent pandemics (peacetime), the 200 biggest metropolitan 
hospitals6 in the U.S. would automatically run diagnostic tests up-
front for novel causative agents for patients who visit the emergency 
room with severe respiratory symptoms that are possibly 
infectious.7 If such a system detects a sufficiently serious pathogen, 
public health agencies would send out diagnostic tests to all 
residents in the affected geographical area(s) within weeks and 
isolate those who test positive.8 This system could be integrated 
with contact tracing and more standard outbreak response. 
This model can be significantly more effective than the system 
that the U.S. currently has in place, which has not consistently tested 
and isolated asymptomatic carriers of novel pathogens sufficiently 
early in the disease spread timeline. Given the exponential nature of 
pandemics,9 pandemic response will be more feasible and cost-
effective the earlier it begins—every day counts in the early stages. 
Ecker analogizes this system to common forest fire prevention 
strategies that “survey aggressively for smaller brush fires and 
 
 5. David J. Ecker, How to Snuff Out the Next Pandemic, SCI. AM. (May 18, 2020), https:/
/blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/how-to-snuff-out-the-next-pandemic/ [https:/
/perma.cc/DWP5-Q5ZF]. Ecker highlights the importance of detecting previously-unknown 
pathogens, because “modern molecular diagnostic technologies detect only those infectious 
agents we already know exist” and “come up blank when presented with a novel agent”. This 
means that with the current U.S. public health infrastructure, new or unexpected pathogens 
cannot be detected until “there are too many unexplained infections to ignore,” with the 
potential for the pathogens to spread widely and become a pandemic. 
 6. Id. Note that while Ecker calls these strategically-selected large urban hospitals 
“surveillance hospitals” in his article, this Comment generally chooses to avoid using the word 
“surveillance” with this model due to the negative connotation of the word. Instead, this 
Comment coins the term “test-and-isolate” and considers the proposed model a pandemic 
detection, monitoring, and prevention model. “Given national epidemiological data—on 
infection rates; where symptomatic people seek health care; and how often diagnostic tests 
are ordered—a remarkably small number of surveillance sites would be required in order to 
identify an outbreak of an emerging agent.” Id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. It is important to note that this Comment focuses on the “isolate” part of the 
“test-and-isolate” model; while the legal issues surrounding genotype testing are important, 
they fall outside the scope of this Comment. 
 9. See, e.g., Junling Ma, Estimating Epidemic Exponential Growth Rate and Basic 
Reproduction Number, 5 INFECTIOUS DISEASE MODELLING 129–41 (2020).  
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stomp them out immediately.”10 The proposed “test-and-isolate” 
future pandemic prevention model responds earlier than existing 
status quo systems in two major ways. Firstly, the proactive 
diagnostic testing in hospitals detects the new pathogen earlier. 
Secondly, identifying and isolating infected persons within weeks 
reduces disease spread among other members of society more 
quickly. Because isolating only those who test positive is less 
disruptive than more general social distancing measures, the test-
and-isolate model would have made it economically and politically 
less costly to isolate early during the Covid-19 pandemic.11 
According to Monte Carlo simulations—a form of computational 
algorithm that applies “repeated random sampling to obtain the 
likelihood of a range of results of occurring,”12 there is a “95 percent 
probability of identifying an emerging infectious disease outbreak if 
only seven symptomatic patients seek health care in this system.”13 
The legal architecture surrounding medical isolation plays an 
essential role in determining whether test-and-isolate methodology 
could be successfully implemented in the U.S. in practice. Given that 
Ecker’s proposed model is relatively new and little explored, 
especially in the field of law,14 this Comment focuses on the legal 
issues surrounding the “isolate” portion of the aforementioned “test-
and-isolate” model as part of the broader pandemic detection and 
prevention architecture. Despite the potential of Ecker’s model in 
preventing the next public health tragedy, there are a number of 
legal challenges that may obstruct the practical implementation of 
such a model, as the law strives to balance pressing public health 
needs with individual civil liberty rights. For a model that prioritizes 
early detection and early response over exactitude on factors such 
as the novel disease’s incubation period and severity level, the 
status quo law in the U.S. is disappointingly insistent on demanding 
more certainty and rigorous scientific evidence of future public 
health risks before authorities can legally mandate medical 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. (“The cost to set up and run a surveillance architecture in 200 urban hospitals 
in the [U.S.] would be well under $1 billion, and it could be done within a year. This cost is 
beyond trivial compared to the current cost of the COVID-19 catastrophe. The CARES Act 
alone has cost our country over $2 trillion.”). 
 12. IBM Cloud Education, Monte Carlo Simulation, IBM (Aug. 24, 2020), https:/
/www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/monte-carlo-simulation [https://perma.cc/8ZL5-7KME]. 
 13. Ecker, supra note 5. 
 14. Although many have written about medical isolation and quarantine laws in the 
context of pandemics such as Ebola and COVID-19, it appears that this future-oriented 
pandemic prevention model has not yet been explored through a legal lens.  
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isolations, although there are ambiguities and uncertainties in 
relevant federal and state law alike. 
Having provided an overview of the “test-and-isolate” model, 
this Comment next zooms in on current pandemic-related medical 
isolation laws in the U.S., offering an overview of the relevant federal 
and state laws, a brief survey of recent scholarship in relation to 
COVID-19, and a summary of an influential recent precedent, Hickox 
v. Christie.15 This Comment then focuses on applying current laws to 
the “isolate” part of the proposed pandemic prevention model to 
determine gaps and challenges for the proposed model given the 
U.S. legal landscape. Finally, this Comment will conclude with 
forward-looking recommendations and reform proposals. 
II. U.S. MEDICAL ISOLATION LAWS IN THE PANDEMIC CONTEXT: A CROWDED 
INTERSECTION 
Despite the U.S. Government’s long history of quarantine and 
isolation orders in the medical context, “the legal instruments for 
imposing quarantine are not especially well-developed.”16 In the 
U.S., the authority to isolate and quarantine individuals in the 
communicable disease context “stands at a crowded intersection of 
federal, state, and constitutional law.”17  
At the federal level, the Commerce Clause gives Congress the 
authority to impose quarantines and isolations.18 Pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, Congress enacted the Public Health Service Act 
(PHSA), Section 264 of which grants the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services the authority to make and enforce regulations 
necessary “to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or 
possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or 
possession.”19 Subsection 264(b) of the statute grants authority to 
quarantine or isolate an individual to control the transmission and 
 
 15. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016). 
 16. Roni Adil Elias, Preventing Contagion and Protecting Civil Liberties: Problems in 
Quarantine & Isolation Law in the United States & Suggestions for Reform, 7 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 
135, 136 (2016). 
 17. Devin Schindler, Gregory Ripple, Melissa Markey, Jesse DePauw, Laura M. Napiewocki 
& Sangeeta Ghosh, Pandemic Legal Preparedness: A Brief Overview, 96 MICH. BAR J. 28, 28 
(2017). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 264(a). 
 
SUMMER 2021] Catch and Contain Novel Pathogens Early! 27 
 
spread of communicable diseases.20 In 2000, the Secretary 
transferred such powers to the Director of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC).21  
Importantly, applied to the “test-and-isolate” model, the statute 
defines the term “qualifying stage” for an individual to go through 
mandatory isolation or quarantine as (1) “in a communicable stage” 
or (2) “in a pre[-]communicable stage, if the disease would be likely 
to cause a public health emergency if transmitted to other 
individuals.”22 This means that the individuals who would need to be 
mandated to go through involuntary isolation under the “test-and-
isolate” model would be considered being in the “qualifying,” “pre[-
]communicable” stage.   
At the state level, the legal authority of individual states to 
investigate and control pandemic outbreaks is grounded in the 
police powers reserved to them under the Tenth Amendment.23 As 
federal authority regarding isolations and quarantines is limited by 
the scope of executive orders, the CDC defers to state authority in 
“their primary use of their own separate quarantine powers” and 
“only in rare situations” (such as “time-sensitive settings”) 
anticipates the need to use federal authority.24 While states’ 
authority to order quarantines and isolations vary widely, there is a 
commonality most states share: state quarantine/isolation laws 
tend to be “very old,” with many relevant statutes ranging from forty 
to one hundred years old.25 Unsurprisingly, the older statutes “often 
do not reflect contemporary scientific understandings of disease, 
[or] current treatments of choice,” and were often drafted to address 
specific epidemics from the past.26 A number of states require a state 
 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 264(b). 
 21. 42 C.F.R. § 70.2-70.8 (2015); Hickox v. Christie, 205 F.Supp.3d 579, 590 (D.N.J. 2016). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(2). 
 23. Schindler et al., supra note 17, at 28. 
 24. CDC, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ADDING POTENTIALLY PANDEMIC 
INFLUENZA VIRUSES TO THE LIST OF QUARANTINABLE DISEASES, http://www.survivalring.org
/pandemic/index.php?file=Questions%20and%20Answers%200n%20the%20Executive%20
0rder%20.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2021). 
 25. Roni Adil Elias, Preventing Contagion and Protecting Civil Liberties: Problems in 
Quarantine & Isolation Law in the United States & Suggestions for Reform , 7 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 
135, 144 (2016). 
 26. See, e.g., State Quarantine and Isolation Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-
statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/X6VX-DW6Y]; Lawrence O. Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita 
Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United 
States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 101–02 (1999). 
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of public health emergency to exist for the state to issue mandatory 
quarantine and/or isolation orders.27 
According to Professor Lindsay Wiley, a health law expert who 
has written about recent developments in quarantine and isolation 
orders in the COVID-19 context, the U.S. system is set up in a way in 
which “the states hold the reins on what we call community 
mitigation measures: social distancing, mask wearing,” while the 
federal government remains “the sole actor in this country with the 
resources and the inter-state coordinating authority to provide for 
other responses,”  especially “well-coordinated supported isolation 
which could have contained the pandemic” and surveillance level 
testing to inform state-level responses.28 The federal government’s 
authority in the quarantine/isolation context is “permissive, rather 
than mandatory.”29 
During the most recent COVID-19 pandemic, legal scholars 
emphasized a few general principles in relation to medical 
isolations. A core principle for governments is employing “the least 
restrictive means necessary to protect public health.”30 According to 
health law expert Lawrence O. Gostin and his co-authors, to meet 
this standard, authorities must base quarantine and isolation on 
“rigorous scientific assessment of risk and effectiveness,” and 
employ such measures only if the individual “is known or highly 
suspected to have been exposed to the disease, and only for the 
maximum duration of incubation (fourteen days for COVID‐19).”31 
Gostin and his co-authors consider mandatory isolations and 
quarantines to carry “enormous legal, ethical, and logistical 
challenges” and, accordingly, should be used “only as a last resort.”32  
In the same article, the authors recommend encouraging self-
isolation and self-quarantine, considering these measures as 
 
 27. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 802(2) (West 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 368e-19a-221 
(2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36.799-89. 
 28. Professor Lindsay Wiley Shares Insights on Health Policy Amid the Pandemic During 




 29. Id. 
 30. Lawrence O. Gostin, Eric A. Friedman & Sarah A. Wetter, Responding to COVID‐19: 
How to Navigate a Public Health Emergency Legally and Ethically , HASTINGS CENT REP. (Mar. 26, 
2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7228225/ [https://perma.cc/8HE8-
CS4F]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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“generally effective” when individuals are “properly informed.”33 
Meanwhile, the authors do recognize the relative ease of enforcing 
isolation and quarantine orders against individuals posing a known 
danger.34 Their main concern is large-scale quarantines “imposed 
without any individualized risk assessment.”35 
Caselaw that is directly applicable to the “test-and-isolate” 
model is wanting given the novel nature of the proposed pandemic 
prevention architecture and the understandable lack of focus on 
future pandemics in lawsuits. Among existing precedent, there are 
more cases on medical quarantines than medical isolations in the 
pandemic context, although court opinions and law review 
publications often fail to clearly distinguish between quarantine and 
isolation precisely. As used in contemporary health practices, 
“quarantine” refers to the “separation of individuals or groups who 
are not ill but are thought to be at risk of becoming infectious,” while 
“isolation”—the focus of this Comment—is defined as “the 
separation of someone who is already ill.”36 Unlike isolation, 
quarantine does not depend on an actual diagnosis, but rather on 
“the belief that the individual has been exposed to a communicable 
disease and may at some future time become infectious.”37 
Importantly, the “test-and-isolate” approach advocated for in this 
Comment, recommends isolating individuals who test positive for 
the newly-detected pathogen early.38 Ecker does not explicitly 
address quarantine as the next precautionary measure for the 
broader community. 
A recent influential case involving medical isolation in a global 
pandemic context is Hickox v. Christie.39 In Hickox, the plaintiff, Kaci 
Hickox, was a trained nurse who served as a medical team leader for 
treating Ebola in Sierra Leone for Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF).40 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantining the Law of Quarantine: Why Quarantine Law Does Not 
Reflect Contemporary Constitutional Law, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2018). 
 37. Id. at 7–8. 
 38. See Ecker, supra note 5. Logically, in Ecker’s model, the next step could be 
quarantining those who have been in close contact with the isolated individuals. These 
quarantine measures, however, likely implicate more civil liberty concerns given that they 
involve more members of the community who are more likely safe from the new pathogen 
than the individuals ordered to go through isolation under the “test-and-isolate” model 
because they are already displaying relevant symptoms and/or have tested positive for the 
newly-detected pathogen. 
 39. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016). 
 40. See id. at 584–85. 
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Just as she was leaving Sierra Leone to return to the U.S., Governor 
Christie signed Executive Order 164 (which created a New Jersey-
wide “Ebola Preparedness Plan” (EPP)) mandating active health 
screening for passengers arriving from West African countries due 
to public health concerns regarding Ebola.41 Hickox’s temperature 
check indicated that she had a fever, and she was ordered to 
undergo medical isolation.42 The “Administrative Order Declaring 
Quarantine and Isolation of Kaci Hickox” invoked the powers of the 
Department of Health (DOH) under N. J. Stat. Ann. § 26:4 et seq. and 
N.J.A.C. § 8:57 et seq.: “Ebola is a contagious, often fatal disease, with 
an incubation period of up to 21 days . . . Hickox had had contact 
with infected individuals . . . was at high risk of exposure . . . [and] 
she experienced the onset of a fever”; because her “medical status 
was uncertain,” the DOH “could not rule out that she was infected 
and posed a danger to public health.”43 The Order required Hickox to 
be in isolation “until it [was] determined that she [did] not present a 
danger to the public health.”44 Hickox subsequently sued the 
government for violating her civil liberty rights. The New Jersey 
district court, considering existing precedent on quarantine case 
law,45 ruled that it could not find that Hickox’s mandatory “isolation 
violated any clearly established constitutional principle embodied in 
quarantine case law.”46 Citing landmark isolation/quarantine cases 
including Jacobson, Reynolds, and Shinnick, the court held that “given 
the important public interests at stake, the cases give the authorities 
a great deal of leeway to detain persons who may turn out not to 
have been sick at all.”47 Applied to this case, although Hickox tested 
negative for Ebola, the court saw that the state was reasonable in 
wishing to determine whether Hickox’s “symptoms would worsen” 
and remaining concerned that she had “previously registered a 
fever.”48 
Hickox is relevant to the scope of this Comment not only as it 
centers medical isolation in a global pandemic context, but also 
because a key element of the fact pattern is that the severity of the 
 
 41. Id. at 585. 
 42. See id. at 586–87. 
 43. Id. at 586–87. Fever is a symptom of the Ebola disease. See, e.g., Ebola (Ebola Virus 
Disease): Signs and Symptoms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov
/vhf/ebola/symptoms/index.html  [https://perma.cc/TK3F-DTVY] (last visited June 7, 2021). 
 44. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 587 (D.N.J. 2016). 
 45. See id. at 590–94. 
 46. Id. at 593. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 594. 
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plaintiff nurse’s illness at the time was unknown—similar to the 
scenario in the future pandemic prevention architecture, where the 
severity of the previously-unknown pathogen is unpredictable.  
The next section of this Comment concentrates on applying the 
aforementioned legal principles and the court’s reasoning in Hickox 
to the specific “isolate” portion of the proposed pandemic detection 
system. 
III. APPLYING CURRENT MEDICAL ISOLATION LAWS TO THE “ISOLATE” 
PORTION OF THE PANDEMIC PREVENTION MODEL: CRITIQUES AND 
CHALLENGES 
As the findings in Section II demonstrate, the laws governing 
isolation in the pandemic context in the United States involve a 
crowded intersection of federal, state, and constitutional laws.49 
Unfortunately, legal issues with regards to infectious diseases are 
“generally not well developed.”50 These features of relevant U.S. laws 
present layers of challenges when applied to the “isolate” portion of 
Ecker’s proposed future pandemic detection architecture. This 
section of the Comment will address several relevant concerns, 
critiquing the current structure in place while anticipating legal 
challenges that will likely arise if we were to implement the “test-
and-isolate” system in the U.S.51 Subsection (A) will focus on 
temporal concerns, including the various medical uncertainties in 
connection with the legal features of the current system. Subsection 
(B) examines the interplay between federal and state authority over 
mandatory isolation orders and their implications on Ecker’s 
proposed system. Last but not least, Subsection (C) considers the 
broader picture, applying Gostin’s key critiques of the U.S. public 
health law system to this specific research focus. 
 
 49. See supra Part II. 
 50. Schindler et al., supra note 17, at 28. 
 51. As a preliminary matter, it is worth re-emphasizing the key differences between 
isolation and quarantine. As Part II of this Comment demonstrates, the distinction is often 
ambiguous among existing caselaw and scholarly sources in the field of law. For the purpose 
of this analysis, we will consider isolation as a less restrictive infringement on individual 
rights than quarantine. This Comment attempts to be as precise as possible in categorizing 
isolation and quarantine differently, including when analyzing sources and cases that treat the 
two as the same. 
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A. Temporal Concerns 
A crucial aspect of the proposed future pandemic detection 
architecture that will likely be subject to legal challenges is time-
related uncertainties. In order for the overall early pathogen-
catching monitoring framework to function smoothly, authorities 
need to be able to isolate individuals who test positive for the new 
pathogen as early as possible. However, current laws make this 
objective difficult to implement in practice on several levels. 
For a starting point, as Section II of the Comment indicates, the 
question of “how soon can individuals be ordered to legally go 
through mandatory isolation in a pandemic?” does not always have a 
clear answer. A number of U.S. states require the state to be in an 
official state of emergency before state health authorities can legally 
mandate isolations (and quarantines).52 Although not all states have 
this requirement as part of their public health statutes,53 this is a 
challenge that would need to be overcome, because by its design, the 
“test-and-isolate” framework aims to isolate the individuals it deems 
threatening to the community’s public health as early as possible so 
that the state would not face a state of emergency in the first place. 
It would be contrary to the proposed system’s objective if one were 
to wait until the threat gets as serious as a state of emergency to 
begin isolating the individuals who will likely pose public health 
risks by testing positive for the newly-detected pathogens.  
In states that do not specify how soon one could be ordered to 
undergo involuntary isolation, the relevant statutes are usually 
either silent or ambiguous on this issue. In terms of the relevant 
legal authority at the federal level, recall that § 264(d)(2) defines 
“qualifying stage” for involuntary isolation/quarantine to 
encompass the “pre-communicable stage,” which might be welcome 
news for Ecker and those who embrace his future pandemic 
response architecture.54 In order to qualify, however, the disease 
would have to “be likely to cause a public health emergency if 
transmitted to other individuals.”55 How likely would suffice as 
“likely” enough under this federal standard is unclear. It cannot be 
taken for granted that the “isolate” portion of the “test-and-isolate” 
strategy could survive the federal test in order to be successfully 
implemented. This is because, during this initial phase of the 
 
 52. See NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 26. 
 53. See id. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(2). 
 55. Id. 
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pandemic response and prevention process, it could be scientifically 
challenging to predict how likely the new pathogen might cause a 
public health emergency that merits the relative extreme measure of 
medical isolations. Gostin and his co-authors would probably be 
skeptical based on their view that isolation and quarantine should 
be the last resort due to the level of civil liberty infringement.56 
Indeed, a key downside of the swift response of the proposed 
model to new pathogens is that there are a number of medical 
uncertainties that will not work well with the current legal 
standards. First, the recommended length of medical isolation for 
any given novel pathogen would likely be unknown, as the disease 
incubation period would probably be unknown at this early stage of 
detection. Under the traditional pandemic response model, 
epidemiologists examine cases based on their geographical 
distribution; they form hypotheses and may be able to calculate a 
mean or median incubation period by comparing the known illness 
date and exposure date with “what is already known for certain 
suspected pathogens (most useful when the pathogen is 
unknown).”57 Ecker has not specified concrete quantitative details 
on what sample size of novel pathogen carriers he is envisioning for 
the “test-and-isolate” system, nor does he provide further 
information on how the method he proposes differs from traditional 
ones.58  This means that it could be difficult to rigorously predict the 
incubation period at the early stage of the process when Ecker does 
strongly advocate starting to isolate individuals. Unlike in Hickox, 
where the incubation period of Ebola was known to be up to 21 
days,59 in the novel pathogen context, it will be logistically difficult 
to impose a specific number of days as the isolation period due to 
this key uncertainty in the medical sciences. Although courts 
understand the significance of public health needs, this unknown 
variable could likely be a hurdle when health authorities strive to 
justify the appropriate length to isolate someone under the “test-
and-isolate” model. 
Second, the symptoms of the new potentially communicable 
disease may not be entirely clear. Ecker’s model proposes an active 
search for severe respiratory/cold-like symptoms, which are 
symptoms for a number of known pandemic-causing diseases, 
 
 56. See Gostin et al., supra note 30. 
 57. MARK S. DWORKIN, OUTBREAK INVESTIGATIONS: CASE STUDIES IN INFECTIOUS DISEASE FIELD 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 7 (2010). 
 58. See Ecker, supra note 5.  
 59. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp. 3d 579, 587–88 (D.N.J. 2016). 
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including the Spanish Flu, H1N1 swine flu, Ebola, and COVID-19.60 
However, there is no guarantee that a future novel pathogen will 
trigger similar symptoms, so the model could potentially 
underpredict the likelihood of new pandemics. Either under-
predicting or over-predicting can have negative consequences 
legally, socially, economically, and politically. 
Third, along those lines, the severity of the disease from the 
novel pathogen will also probably be unknown. The fatality of Ebola 
is, as discussed, a factor in the Hickox case that the court considered 
in upholding the mandatory isolation and quarantine of the plaintiff, 
although legal standards are still somewhat ambiguous regarding 
the requisite level of severity of a given disease.61 Given the law’s 
general obsession with key principles such as necessity and 
proportionality in balancing between public health needs and 
individuals’ civil rights (e.g. Fourteenth Amendment rights), this 
unknown factor will likely raise many an eyebrow among judges, 
legal academics, and others. Gostin and his co-authors, who caution 
against “large-scale quarantines62 imposed without any 
individualized risk assessment,”63 may demand a less restrictive 
option. This Comment nevertheless recommends the legal and 
medical community alike give the “test-and-isolate” model serious 
thought as a creative proposal that could solve a century-long 
problem that has haunted the global community repeatedly. 
 
 60. See, e.g., Spanish Flu, HISTORY (May 19, 2020), https://www.history.com/topics
/world-war-i/1918-flu-pandemic [https://perma.cc/2SMP-6BV4]; Questions and Answers: 
2009 H1N1 Flu (Swine Flu) and You, CDC (Feb. 10, 2010, 5:00 PM), https://www.cdc.gov
/h1n1flu/qa.htm [https://perma.cc/G5G5-3SKF]; Rebecca M. Mingo, James A. Simmons, 
Charles J. Shoemaker, Elizabeth A. Nelson, Kathryn L. Schornberg, Ryan S. D’Souza, James E. 
Casanova, & Judith M. White, Ebola Virus and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 
Display Late Cell Entry Kinetics: Evidence that Transport to NPC1+ Endolysosomes Is a Rate-
Eefining Step, 89 J. VIROLOLOGY 2931 (2015); Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), MAYO 
CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/symptoms-causes/syc-
20479963 [https://perma.cc/8PDJ-42RQ] (last visited June 18, 2021). 
 61. See Hickox, 205 F. Supp. 3d at 587–88. Note that in Hickox, the nurse had direct 
exposure to Ebola patients and the fatality of the disease was publicly known. On the other 
hand, while Hickox registered a fever—a known symptom of Ebola—she ultimately tested 
negative for Ebola, yet the court still considered medical isolation and quarantine to be 
appropriate. See generally id.; see also supra Part II. The Hickox holding can support Ecker’s 
proposed model in terms of the isolation recommendations, but to a limited degree 
considering all the nuanced differences in the fact pattern when compared against the future 
pandemic response model. 
 62. This likely includes isolations, since the word “quarantine” was used fairly broadly. 
 63. Gostin et al., supra note 30. 
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B. Federal vs. State Concerns 
Temporal considerations aside, Ecker’s proposal also implicates 
concerns about federal and state authority. As Section II of this 
Comment suggests, there is some overlapping authority in federal 
and state powers to mandate quarantines, with federal power being 
“permissive, rather than mandatory.”64 There is a degree of 
messiness and uncertainty regarding what authority is ultimately 
responsible for which aspects of mandatory isolations in the 
pandemic response context. Firstly, as stated, different states have 
distinct statutes regarding medical isolations and quarantines, and 
the discrepancy will likely continue to exist.65 For the “isolate” 
portion of the “test-and-isolate” model, however, this feature of the 
American health law system could be problematic, because the 
proposed network of 200 metropolitan hospitals running 
metagenomic tests that are spread out across the country 
necessitates strong coordination and monitoring between the 
federal and state levels, as well as effective interstate 
communications on a timely basis.66 Uniformity and consistency are 
critical to the proposed future pandemic prevention model’s 
success: Ecker regards “real-time central monitoring” based on the 
metagenomic test results from individual hospitals as a crucial part 
of a rapid public health response.67 The current system and legal 
structure in place do not easily facilitate such coordination.68 
 
 64. Professor Lindsay Wiley Shares Insights on Health Policy Amid the Pandemic During 




 65. See supra Section II; See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 26; Gostin 
et al., supra note 30. Hickox’s New Jersey and Maine lawsuits, for example, had different 
outcomes. Compare Hickox v. Christie, 205 F.Supp.3d 579 (D.N.J. 2016), with Mayhew v. 
Hickox, No. CV-2014-36 (Me. Dist. Ct., Fort Kent, Oct. 31, 2014). 
 66. See Ecker, supra note 5.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Moreover, the interplay between the federal and state authorities also calls into 
question how the different authorities will be delegating responsibility. My own theory is that 
this is not likely a case where various levels of government compete for power, but rather one 
where one might prefer the other to take fuller responsibility given the limited time and 
resources different branches of government have. One should be cautious of a scenario where 
each level of government attempts to evade accountability: after all, no one especially enjoys 
restricting residents’ freedoms; it can be politically unsavory, especially in election years. See, 
e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & Meryl Justin Chertoff, Lockdowns, Quarantines, And Travel 
Restrictions, During COVID And Beyond: What’s The Law, And How Should We Decide?, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210322.450239
/full/ [https://perma.cc/4LW2-SXEV]. 
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Furthermore, the current legal authority for medical isolations 
in the context of contagious disease response and prevention 
appears to be derived from laws that were not designed for these 
purposes. It may appear rather odd that the federal authority is 
based on the Commerce Clause, while the state power to order 
mandatory isolations is from states’ police power.69 Judging by their 
names alone, neither the Commerce Clause nor police power is 
directly relevant to public health. The Commerce Clause origin of the 
federal power, for example, does place its own restrictions in 
shaping the focal point of most legal precedent involved in the 
analysis: international and inter-state air travel.70 International and 
inter-state travel is a particular sub-topic of medical isolations in the 
pandemic context, but one that is not directly relevant to the “test-
and-isolate” model, which is primality concerned with local cases 
that could involve novel pathogens. Hickox, for instance, was 
fundamentally concerned with border-crossing, as the plaintiff 
traveled back to the U.S. from abroad, and then traveled from New 
Jersey to Maine.71 The fact pattern in the “test-and-isolate” model 
would not be nearly as concerned with the international/interstate 
components, which means that the applicability of prevalent legal 
precedent is limited in scope due to the fundamental differences in 
the geographic aspects. 
C. Zooming Out: the General Flaws of U.S. Public Health Law Applied 
to this Context 
This Comment opened with the analogy of forest fires to 
demonstrate the philosophy behind the future pandemic prevention 
landscape. To use another forest metaphor, one needs to see both 
the forest and the trees: having examined individual components of 
the relevant laws on the isolation piece of the future pandemic 
response strategy, we now briefly look at the broader picture—
American public health law being the larger forest. Are there unique 
attributes of the U.S. public health law system that render it 
especially difficult to implement the “test-and-isolate” model, given 
that we have already identified a number of potential obstacles?  
In his book Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, Gostin 
emphasizes three general problems with the U.S. public health law 
 
 69. See supra Section II. 
 70. Id.; see also Gostin et al., supra note 68. 
 71. Hickox v. Christie, 205 F.Supp.3d 579, 585–88 (D.N.J. 2016). 
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system: antiquity, multi-layered authority, and inconsistency.72 
These problems are relevant to the topic explored in this Comment. 
First, Gostin critiques public health law, which was framed in the 
late-ninetieth to early/mid-twentieth centuries, as not reflective of 
“contemporary scientific understandings of injury and disease or 
legal norms for protection of individual rights,” because when 
relevant statutes were written, epidemiology, biostatistics, and 
behavioral sciences, for example, “were in their infancy.”73  Applied 
to the context of this project, the proposed pandemic detection 
architecture uses cutting-edge technologies, such as contact tracing, 
computational infrastructure, and metagenomic sequencing.74 Old 
health laws generally did not have these in mind since they were 
designed to react to pandemics. 
Second, Gostin considers it troublesome that “the disparate legal 
structures of state public health laws can significantly undermine 
their effectiveness,” especially in state health codes in the infectious 
disease context.75  Communicable disease laws were primarily 
“enacted piecemeal in response to specific epidemics, they tell the 
story of the history of disease control”; subsequently, “laws enacted 
in such an ad hoc fashion are often inconsistent, redundant, and 
ambiguous.”76 Applied here, the pandemic response architecture 
advocated by this Comment will have the capacity to catch new 
pathogens, regarding which science will confront itself with various 
uncertainties in the short term—the length of effective isolations 
and quarantines, for example, will likely be unknown.77 It is 
concerning, therefore, that the law seems to be disease-specific and 
is already “inconsistent, redundant, and ambiguous.”78 
Third, Gostin believes that “public health laws remain 
fragmented not only within states[,] but also among them.”79 Specific 
to the medical isolation context for pandemics, this is consistent 
with the findings of Roni Adil Elias80 that, firstly, “few formal 
structures exist to assure coordinated action among officials at 
 
 72. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 24 (2d ed. 2008). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Ecker, supra note 5.  
 75. GOSTIN, supra note 72. 
 76. Id. Examples include “smallpox, yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, 
polio, HIV/AIDS, West Nile virus, and SARS.” Id. 
 77. See supra Section III(A). 
 78. GOSTIN, supra note 72. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Roni Adil Elias is an author who has published numerous pieces related to 
contagions. 
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different levels of government,” and secondly, “regardless of 
whether public health powers and policy are effectively coordinated 
on a national level, the law establishing authority for public officials 
is often ill-defined.”81 This is especially fatal in the “test-and-isolate” 
model we have in mind, where effective coordination and 
consistency among facilities in different states are critical to the 
proposed pandemic prevention system’s success.82 
The next section of this Comment attempts to synthesize the key 
contributions and findings while concluding on a forward-looking 
note, including a few recommendations for reforms. 
IV. SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THINKING AHEAD TO PREVENT THE 
NEXT PANDEMIC 
It may be commonsensical that to prevent a future forest fire 
that could destroy many lives and homes, one would “survey 
aggressively for smaller brush fires and stomp them out 
immediately.”83 Similarly, one should not be surprised by the 
suggestion that to prevent a future pandemic that could rival COVID-
19 in its public health, economic, and social consequences, public 
health authorities should try their very best at detecting potentially 
dangerous pathogens as early as possible and halting them as soon 
as they can.  
Ecker’s pandemic prevention architecture shows promising 
potential as a creative solution to harness the power of the latest 
technological advances to solve this centuries-old problem to 
humankind. By identifying and reflecting on a myriad of legal 
challenges that the “test-and-isolate” model may face in relation to 
current U.S. medical isolation laws on both the federal and state 
level, this Comment hopes to inspire further conversations among 
public health, legal, and interdisciplinary experts to collaborate on 
ways to overcome these legal challenges.84 It will be fitting to 
 
 81. Elias, supra note 16. 
 82. See supra Section III(B). 
 83. Ecker, supra note 5.  
 84. Law review articles on health law in the pandemic context have focused on previous 
and current pandemics instead of future ones. This Comment attempts to stimulate 
subsequent research and conversations on this topic. As mentioned, this Comment specifically 
focuses on the “isolate” part of the “test-and-isolate” model. The “test” part is equally 
important when it comes to legal issues and challenges surrounding the testing aspects 
involved in Ecker’s model in order for it to be implemented. Possible topics for further 
research include        (i) whether in the absence of a pandemic, consent and information are 
needed to run such genotyping of pathogens rather than it being routine care, and (ii) 
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conclude this Comment with a few forward-looking 
recommendations for possible reform options. 
Firstly, the federal and local government should actively 
consider creative solutions such as Ecker’s by incentivizing research 
projects that incorporate the latest scientific and technological 
developments in brainstorming options to prevent future 
pandemics as early as possible. Specific to Ecker’s proposal, scholars 
and practitioners should consider researching ways to help shed 
light on information needed to make the decisions to mandate 
medical isolation, including (i) the severity of the disease in the 
individuals in whom a novel pathogen is initially detected, and (ii) if 
there is an estimate of how contagious the new disease is, e.g. based 
on testing information or other types of outbreak monitoring, such 
as sewage sequencing and traveler sequencing. Although 
information such as these will be difficult to uncover, resources can 
be spent up-front to, at a minimum, discover more efficient ways to 
answer these pressing questions in relation to the legal standards 
addressed in this Comment. 
In his recent interview with The Harvard Crimson, Michael Mina, 
an epidemiologist at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, 
advocated for a an early-warning system that is similar to Ecker’s 
proposed “test-and-isolate” framework.85 He offers creative 
solutions from the scientific perspective in this interview, suggesting 
that it is feasible to implement an efficient blood-testing based 
system for this pandemic prevention architecture. 86 Mina believes 
that there needs to be a “whole new way of thinking” and would like 
to start a new field that he calls “public health engineering,” because 
“ultimately, the response to an outbreak has to be engineered.”87  
Secondly, Gostin and his co-authors believe that voluntary 
isolations and quarantines can be effective solutions.88 However, as 
the COVID-19 crisis has shown, some individuals have been 
 
questions of payment for physicians, tests themselves; e.g. whether there are reliable models 
for this that existed pre-Covid-19, and if so, how consent and payment work, etc. 
 85. Alvin Powell, A Key to the Next Pandemic: An Early-Warning System, THE HARVARD 
GAZETTE (May 19, 2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/05/michael-mina-
shares-insight-on-how-to-prevent-another-pandemic
/?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20Gazette%20
20210520%20(1) [https://perma.cc/SH2V-KNJW].  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Gostin et al., supra note 30. 
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reluctant to comply with even mandatory orders.89 Nevertheless, 
one way to incentivize members of society to isolate or quarantine 
themselves more voluntarily might be offering financial incentives. 
New Jersey, for instance, offers job protection and compensation to 
persons under medical isolation or quarantine.90 
To Mina, “the way that we communicate public health to the 
public needs to change” and needs to have campaigns that are on 
par with those of large for-profit corporations such as Coca-Cola.91 
The COVID-19 pandemic has already been a $16 trillion hit on the 
U.S. economy; it would be cost-efficient, to say the least, for the U.S. 
government to devote $2 billion into a marketing and awareness-
raising campaign to encourage greater public compliance where the 
law does not necessarily do so.92 Teaching individual members of 
society about public health will be an essential way to facilitate 
voluntary isolations and quarantines for the public’s health 
priorities at large.93 Fortunately, Mina does find that the new 
generation of young people are “more engaged with each other”94 
and expresses hope that the growing interest in public policy in 
infectious disease dynamics will drive this new generation to 
energetically rally around to build grassroots awareness-raising 
campaigns on public health. 
In considering further reform options, one should keep Gostin’s 
three general critiques on U.S. public health law in mind by being 
responsive to new technological advances—ideally not only current 
technologies, but also future ones, being more consistent and less 
redundant or ambiguous,95 and facilitating strengthened 
 
 89. See, e.g., Christopher Brito, Spring Breakers Say Coronavirus Pandemic Won’t Stop 
Them From Partying, CBS NEWS (Mar. 25, 2020 10:05 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ 
spring-break-party-coronavirus-pandemic-miami-beaches/ [https://perma.cc/J83G-JA5J].  
 90. See N.J. Stat. § 26:13-16 (2005) (“Any person who has been placed in isolation or 
quarantine pursuant to an order of the commissioner and who at the time of quarantine or 
isolation was in the employ of any public or private employer, other than a temporary 
position, shall be reinstated to such employment or to a position of like seniority, status and 
pay . . . .”). Specifics may fall more within the scope of employment law. I defer to experts 
regarding the details. 
 91. Powell, supra note 85. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantining the Law of Quarantine: Why Quarantine Law 
Does Not Reflect Contemporary Constitutional Law, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1, 16 (2018) 
(discussing the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA)); Stephanie Cooper 
Blum, Federalism: Fault or Feature—An Analysis of Whether the United States Should 
Implement a Federal Pandemic Statute, 60 WASHBURN L.J. 24 (2020); Cara M. Passaro, 
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coordination among health authorities across states nation-wide. 
With greater collaboration among experts across disciplines, we will 
be better positioned to prevent the next pandemic for the world at 
large. 
 
Reforming Quarantine: Moving Towards a More Ethical and Effective Approach to Outbreak 
Management, 21 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 57 (2018). 
